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Cost of equity capital
a b s t r a c t
We hypothesize that managers use stock splits to attract more uninformed trading so
that market makers can provide liquidity services at lower costs, thereby increasing
investors’ trading propensity and improving liquidity. We examine a large sample of
stock splits and ﬁnd that, consistent with our hypothesis, the incidence of no trading
decreases and liquidity risk is lower following splits, implying a decline in latent trading
costs and a reduced cost of equity capital. Further, split announcement returns are
correlated with the improvements in both liquidity levels and liquidity risk. Our analysis
suggests nontrivial economic beneﬁts from liquidity improvements, with less liquid
ﬁrms beneﬁting more from stock splits.
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Managers often claim that stock splits are intended to
attract more investors and to improve stock liquidity
(Dolley, 1933; Baker and Gallagher, 1980; Baker and
Powell, 1993). Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) examine
ADR solo-splits and ﬁnd evidence supportive of the
liquidity improvement argument. Similarly, Amihud,
Mendelson, and Uno (1999) show that, in Japan, a ﬁrm’s
investor base and stock liquidity increase signiﬁcantly
when the ﬁrm reduces its stock’s minimum trading unit
(i.e., the number of shares in a round lot). However, many
studies question whether liquidity improves after stock
splits. In fact, Copeland (1979), Conroy, Harris, and Benet
(1990), Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001), and Gray, Smith,
and Whaley (2003) show that while splits lower stock price
levels, they raise bid-ask spreads rather than improving the
stocks’ liquidity. Also, Copeland (1979) and Lamoureux and
Poon (1987) ﬁnd that turnover decreases following stock
splits, which leads them to surmise that ‘‘splits induce
permanent reductions in liquidity.’’
The ﬁndings intrigue Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001,
p. 25), who note that ‘‘stock splits remain one of the most
popular and least understood phenomena in equity
marketsy why a split per se is necessary is uncleary
empirical research has documented a wide range of
negative effects such as increased volatility, larger
proportional spreads and larger transaction costs follow-
ing the splits. On balance, it remains a puzzle why
companies ever split their shares.’’
In this paper, we offer a new perspective on the issue.
Our premise is that non-trading reﬂects illiquidity. This
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premise is motivated by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka
(1999), Lesmond (2005), Liu (2006), and Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2007). In particular, Lesmond, Ogden, and
Trzcinka (1999) argue that informed investors will trade
only if the value of information exceeds trading costs.
Similarly, liquidity traders might refrain from trading if
trading costs outweigh the improvement in portfolio
allocation. Hence, the trading decision is endogenous
and a function of trading costs, which are directly related
to market-making costs. We do not observe trading costs
or market-making costs; but ex post we can observe
whether trades have occurred, and we can then infer the
latent trading costs. Holding other things constant, greater
incidence of no trading implies higher (unobservable)
trading costs and lower liquidity.1
While the bid-ask spread is conventionally used to
measure trading costs, it has a limitation—the bid and ask
quotes are often for small-size trades, whereas a larger
transaction size might need to be negotiated. As Liu (2006,
p. 631) points out, liquidity can be generally described as
‘‘the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost
with less price impact.’’ This suggests that liquidity is
multifaceted and might not be well represented by the
bid-ask spread, either before or after a stock split.
Similarly, because of the endogeneity of the trading
decision, standard measures such as Amihud’s (2002)
illiquidity measure and Kyle’s (1985) lambda, which focus
on the price impacts of trades, might not be able to fully
capture the illiquidity of non-trading, either before or
after a split.
Thus, we propose the trading continuity improvement
hypothesis to explain how a stock split might improve
liquidity and why it could be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. Our
hypothesis posits that, for a ﬁrm facing some possibility of
trading discontinuity or no trading, managers have
incentives to use a stock split to attract more uninformed
traders to participate in trading. Indeed, Schultz (2000)
shows a signiﬁcant increase in small trades following the
splits. Further, Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001) document
more uninformed trades—and more informed trades as
well—after stock splits.2 More uninformed trading allows
market makers to reduce their inventory holding costs
and adverse information cost, which could lead to lower
trading costs and liquidity improvements. In an improved
liquidity environment, stock prices are less affected by
shocks to market liquidity. Thus, our hypothesis predicts
that, after stock splits, investors would face lower liquidity
risk and require a lower liquidity premium, which in turn
would reduce the cost of equity capital for the ﬁrm and
increase ﬁrm value.
We use a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stock
splits to test our hypothesis. To measure the degree of
trading discontinuity on each sample stock, we use Liu’s
(2006) LM12, the standardized turnover-adjusted number
of days with zero trading volume over the prior 12
months. Similar to Fama and French’s (1996) size and
book-to-market factors, Liu constructs a mimicking
liquidity factor, LIQ, as the return difference between a
low-liquidity portfolio (containing stocks with high LM12)
and a high-liquidity portfolio (containing stocks with low
LM12), and develops a liquidity-augmented CAPM
(LCAPM). He shows that ﬁrms with greater liquidity risk
earn higher returns, indicating that investors require a
liquidity premium to compensate for the higher liquidity
risk. Furthermore, he demonstrates that his LCAPM can
explain the anomalies associated with ﬁrm size, book-to-
market, cash-ﬂow-to-price, earnings-to-price, dividend
yield, and long-run price reversals. Because of its
explanatory power on the cross-section of stock returns,
we use Liu’s model to measure liquidity risk and the cost
of equity capital for each of our sample stocks.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the
incidence of no trading decreases (implying lower latent
costs of trading), liquidity risk is mitigated, and the cost of
equity capital is reduced following stock splits. Further,
the split announcement returns are correlated with
improvements in both liquidity levels and liquidity risk.
While ﬁrms with more frequent trading discontinuities
beneﬁt more from stock splits, those with daily trades
beneﬁt as well.3 On average, liquidity improvements
reduce the cost of equity capital by 17.3%, or 2.42% points
per annum, suggesting that the economic beneﬁts of stock
splits are nontrivial.
It is worth pointing out that the prior literature
suggests two possible reasons for the positive effects of
splits on prices. The ﬁrst is liquidity improvement, given
the positive value–liquidity relation (e.g., Amihud and
Mendelson, 1986). Alternatively, the positive price reac-
tion could be explained by Brennan and Copeland’s (1988)
signaling proposition, which is based on the premise that
splits raise transaction costs and hence serve as a costly
signal of managers’ private information. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with the ﬁrst explanation, and do not support
the basis of Brennan and Copeland’s (1988) signaling
model because latent trading costs decline rather than
increase after stock splits.
The rest of our study is organized as follows. Section 2
formally proposes the trading continuity improvement
hypothesis for ﬁrms’ stock split decisions. Section 3
presents Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure. Section 4 dis-
cusses our sample selection and the characteristics of the
sample ﬁrms. Section 5 presents empirical results of the
effect of stock splits on liquidity. Section 6 presents
evidence that stock splits lead to liquidity risk reduction,
resulting in a lower cost of equity capital. Section 7
investigates whether the split announcement returns are
correlated with the liquidity improvements. Section 8
contains our conclusions.
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2. The trading continuity improvement hypothesis
Uninformed traders play an important role in deter-
mining stock liquidity. As Stoll (1989) points out, there are
three components of market-making costs—order proces-
sing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse informa-
tion costs. The last component represents market makers’
losses from trading with informed investors, which can be
covered by gains from trading with uninformed investors.
Thus, more uninformed trading could reduce both market
makers’ inventory holding costs and adverse information
costs. This implies that managers can reduce trading costs
for shareholders and improve their stock’s liquidity if
there is a corporate policy that can be used to attract more
uninformed traders to participate in trading.
Stock splits appear to be such a corporate policy in that
they can attract more uninformed traders for the follow-
ing reasons. As Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) point
out, a stock split is usually preceded by a signiﬁcant
increase in stock price. By engaging in a split to lower the
price level, managers can effectively make buying shares
easier for small investors. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) also
argue that stock splits are executed by ﬁrms that have
enjoyed unusual growth in both earnings and stock prices,
and that the main objective of the split appears to be to
return the stock price to a ‘‘normal’’ range in the wake of
the unusual growth. Similarly, So and Tse (2000) address
the sociological aspects of maintaining a stable target-
price habit, and argue that one of the principal reasons for
stock splits is to conform to the market norm. As Copeland
(1979) suggests, there might be a certain clientele that
prefers to buy stocks at a certain (lower) price range.4 This
clientele is usually thought to be uninformed or small
investors (see also Easley, O’Hara, and Saar, 2001). Harris
(1996) and Angel (1997) suggest that another clientele
that could be attracted by a stock split might be traders,
who ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply liquidity via limit orders
due to split-induced increases in (proportional) tick size.
Using NYSE non-public data, Lipson (1999) indeed shows
that the use of limit orders slightly increases following the
splits and that the realized execution cost of limit orders
declines substantially. However, he ﬁnds that the realized
execution cost for market orders increases.
Furthermore, managers could use stock splits to attract
more analysts to follow their stocks. According to Brennan
and Hughes (1991), splits could create incentives for
brokerage houses to produce more information on split
ﬁrms. Similarly, Schultz (2000) argues that splits give
stockbrokers greater incentives to promote the stocks (see
also Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, and Tse, 2005). Im-
proved information production and promotion of the split
ﬁrms could attract more investors to participate in stock
trading.
In view of these reasons, we propose the trading
continuity improvement hypothesis to explain ﬁrms’ stock
split decisions. It posits that ﬁrms facing some possibility
of trading discontinuity can use stock splits to attract
more uninformed trading. This enables market makers to
provide liquidity services at lower cost following the
splits. With lower trading costs, investors’ propensity to
trade increases. Thus, while the split-induced increase in
uninformed trading contributes to trading continuity, the
resulting lower trading costs further improve trading
continuity after the splits.
Furthermore, as the liquidity environment improves,
stock prices should become more resilient and less
vulnerable to shocks to market liquidity. Consequently,
investors face reduced liquidity risk and require a lower
liquidity premiumwhich, in turn, lowers the cost of equity
capital for the ﬁrm, and the value of the ﬁrm should
increase. Indeed, as many studies have documented, the
market reacts positively to stock splits; see, e.g., Grinblatt,
Masulis, and Titman (1984), Lamoureux and Poon (1987),
and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996).
To test our hypothesis, we focus on the following
issues. First, do stock splits improve liquidity in terms of
greater trading continuity? Second, do stock splits reduce
the liquidity risk that investors face and lower ﬁrms’ cost
of equity capital? Third, given the importance of liquidity
in asset pricing (see Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen,
2005), are split announcement returns related to im-
provements in both liquidity levels and liquidity risk?
In the following sections, we describe how we measure
liquidity before and after the splits, collect our split
sample, and conduct our analyses to address the above
issues.
3. Measuring stock liquidity
Based on the premise that a greater incidence of no
trading implies higher latent costs of trading and that
non-trading reﬂects illiquidity, we measure stock liquidity
using Liu’s (2006) LMx, the standardized turnover-
adjusted number of days with zero trading volume over
the prior x months. Speciﬁcally, Liu formulates his LMx as







where ‘‘x-month turnover’’ is the stock’s turnover in the
prior x months calculated as the sum of daily turnover
over the prior x months (daily turnover is the ratio of the
number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares
outstanding at the end of the day), NoTD is the total
number of trading days in the market over the prior x




for all sample stocks (for example, Liu chooses a deﬂator
of 11,000 in constructing his LM12).
Liu (2006) shows that LMx reﬂects multiple dimen-
sions of liquidity, is highly correlated with conventional
liquidity measures such as bid-ask spread, turnover, and
price impact measures, and places particular emphasis on
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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matched funds, split funds experience signiﬁcant increases in share-
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trading discontinuity. The measure uses the number of
zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months to
capture the intuition that the absence of trading in a
security indicates its degree of illiquidity. As expected, Liu
shows that smaller ﬁrms and ﬁrms with high book-to-
market equity ratios, which tend to be less liquid, have
high LM12. Also, compared to ﬁrms with low LM12, there
is a signiﬁcant liquidity premium associated with ﬁrms
with high LM12.
While LMx emphasizes trading discontinuity at the
daily level, trading discontinuity could also occur at
the intraday level (e.g., on an hourly basis). Unfortunately,
the measure does not explicitly take into account intraday
trading discontinuity. As Liu (2006, p. 636) points out,
‘‘LMx uses the pure number of zero daily trading volumes
over the prior x months to identify the least liquid stocks,
but it relies on turnover to distinguish the most liquid
among frequently traded stocks as classiﬁed by the pure
number of zero trading volumes.’’ Thus, for stocks that
trade every day, it is possible that stock splits attract more
trades (Schultz, 2000; Easley, O’Hara, and Saar, 2001), but
that turnover decreases (Copeland, 1979; Lamoureux and
Poon, 1987). That is, following the splits, there could be
more trades, but the average trade size might not increase
proportionately with the split factor, resulting in a
lower turnover. In this case (for the more liquid ﬁrms
with LMxo1), since LMx is essentially determined by
1/turnover, it might not show a split-induced improve-
ment in intraday trading continuity, indicating that the
measure has its limitations. Nevertheless, with zero-
volume days as its main component, LMx would sufﬁ-
ciently capture severe illiquidity, as manifested in non-
trading.
4. Data
To test the trading continuity improvement hypothesis,
we use a sample of 3,721 stock splits that occur during the
30-year period from 1975 to 2004. We identify this
sample by searching through the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) ﬁles for ordinary single-class
common stocks with a split factor of one or higher, a
pre-split price of $10 or above, and the availability of both
ﬁrm size (i.e., pre-split market value of equity) and the
book value of equity on the Compustat ﬁles over the
1975–2004 period. Furthermore, we require each sample
ﬁrm to have at least one year of daily trading volume data,
both before and after its stock split, available on the CRSP
ﬁles for computing our liquidity measure, LM12. The split
factor is the number of additional shares issued per
existing share. For example, a split factor of one means a
two-for-one split, i.e., investors receive one additional
share for every old share they hold. To be included in our
sample, a stock must have a share code of 10 or 11 and be
a single-class stock, with the CRSP Factor to Adjust Price
(FACPR) equal to or greater than one and equal to the CRSP
Factor to Adjust Shares Outstanding (FACSHR). We require
ﬁrm size and book equity so that we can determine in
which ﬁrm size quartile and B/M (book-to-market equity
ratio) quartile each split ﬁrm is. As we show in the next
section, for each split ﬁrm, we choose a comparable
(benchmark) ﬁrm, which is a non-split ﬁrmwhose price at
the end of month 1 (relative to the declaration month) is
closest to that of the split ﬁrm among all non-split ﬁrms in
the same size quartile and B/M quartile as the split ﬁrm.
Of the 3,721 splits, 2,109 are for NYSE/AMEX stocks
over the 1975–2004 sample period, and the remaining
1,612 are for Nasdaq stocks over the 1985–2004 sample
period. A total of 3,399, or 91.3%, have a split factor equal
to one; 269, or 7.2%, have a split factor greater than one
and less than or equal to two; and the remaining 53, or
1.5%, have a split factor above two. The highest split factor
in our sample is 9.
In terms of pre-split liquidity, denoted as preLM12,
about 28.7%, or 1,069 ﬁrms, have preLM12  1, and the
remaining 71.3%, or 2,652 ﬁrms, have preLM12o1. While
the ﬁrms in the former subsample have at least one zero-
volume day in the year prior to the splits, the ﬁrms in the
latter subsample have trades every day. Our trading
continuity improvement hypothesis postulates that, for
ﬁrms with some possibility of trading discontinuity,
managers could use stock splits to improve their stock’s
illiquidity. This suggests that the effects of stock splits on
liquidity improvements would be greater for less liquid
ﬁrms. For this reason, we carry out our analyses for the
full sample as well as for the preLM12 subsamples.
Table 1 reports the mean and the median of pre-split
ﬁrm characteristics for the full sample and for each
subsample by stock exchange and by preLM12. For the full
sample, the average pre-split price, measured at day 5
relative to the declaration date, is $58.23, and the average
split factor is 1.11, i.e., shareholders receive 1.11 additional
shares on average for every pre-split share they have. The
average ﬁrm size prior to the splits is $4.55 billion. The
average book-to-market equity ratio is 0.373, suggesting
that the sample ﬁrms tend to have relatively high growth
opportunities.
While the pre-split average prices and split factors are
similar between the NYSE/AMEX and the Nasdaq sub-
samples, the Nasdaq stocks are generally smaller in terms
of ﬁrm size. Further, the Nasdaq stocks also have an
average book-to-market equity ratio of 0.287, versus 0.438
for the NYSE/AMEX stocks. Due to the distinctions in ﬁrm
characteristics and the differences in how trading volumes
are reported, we control for the effect of the listing
exchange while examining the effects of stock splits
on liquidity.
Relative to ﬁrms with preLM12o1, ﬁrms with
preLM12  1 are, on average, smaller ($0.43 billion vs.
$6.21 billion) and have a higher B/M (0.502 vs. 0.321).
Furthermore, the pre-split number of shareholders is
smaller as well (2,645 vs. 26,792). While the average ﬁrm
in the preLM12o1 subsample splits their shares at a price
of $65.57, the less liquid ﬁrms with preLM12  1 tend to
split their shares at $40.03.
Table 2 reports changes in ﬁrm characteristics from
before to after stock splits. For the full sample, the split
lowers the average post-split share price, measured at day
+5 relative to the ex-distribution date, to $29.94 from
$58.23 prior to the splits. Consistent with the hypothesis
that stock splits attract new investors (Lamoureux and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Poon, 1987; Maloney and Mulherin, 1992; Mukherji, Kim,
and Walker, 1997), the average number of shareholders
signiﬁcantly increases from 20,646 before the split to
24,982 after the split. The average number of institutional
investors increases as well, from 119 to 131. However,
there is a slight decrease in average institutional share
ownership, from 46.3% to 45.3%. These results suggest that
while stock splits attract new investors, existing share-
holders appear to sell a portion of the shares they receive
pursuant to the stock splits. Consequently, there are more
investors holding the shares, on average, but the propor-
tionate holding per investor seems to decline following
the splits.
The average increase in investor base is particularly
notable for the subsample of ﬁrms with preLM12  1,
which changes from 2,645 pre-split shareholders to 6,893
post-split shareholders, a 160% increase! The preLM12o1
subsample increases from 26,792 pre-split shareholders
to 31,150 post-split shareholders, a 16% increase. In the
sections that follow, we will address the extent to which
the increase in investor base following the splits con-
tributes to the trading continuity improvement and to
liquidity risk reduction. Also, consistent with Merton
(1987), Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997) ﬁnd that split
announcement returns are positively related to the
increase in the investor base. We will control for the
increase in the investor base as well in testing our
hypothesis that split announcement returns are correlated
with liquidity improvements.
Table 2 also reports changes in liquidity based on Roll’s
(1984) spread, the Gibbs estimate of Roll’s spread as
suggested by Hasbrouck (2005), Amihud’s (2002) price
impact measure, and average daily turnover.5 For Roll’s
spread, Amihud’s impact measure, and turnover, the pre-
split estimates are obtained frommonth 12 to month 1
relative to the declaration month, and the post-split
estimates are from month 1 to month 12 relative to the
ex-distribution month. Hasbrouck (2005) suggests that
Gibbs estimate might not be reliable if the observation
number of daily returns used in estimation is less than 50.
Hence, if the number of pre-split (post-split) return
observations is less than 50, we use the Gibbs estimate
from one year before (after) the split year.
On average, both Roll’s spread and the Gibbs estimate
of Roll’s spread increase signiﬁcantly following the splits,
which is consistent with Copeland (1979), Conroy, Harris,
and Benet (1990), Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001), and
Gray, Smith, and Whaley (2003). However, we ﬁnd that




This table reports the mean (median) values of ﬁrm characteristics prior to the split. Split factor (splitfactor) is the number of additional shares per old
share issued. Pre-split share price (preprc) is the closing price or bid/ask average from CRSP at day 5 relative to the stock split declaration date. Pre-split
market capitalization (presz) is market value in millions, and the pre-split book-to-market ratio (prebm) is the ratio of book equity value (Compustat item
60+item 74) to market value of equity at day 5 relative to the declaration date. Pre-split investor base (preinvestor) is the number of shareholders (in
1,000 s, Compustat item 100) before the declaration month. Pre-split institutions (preinstitution) is the number of 13f institutions that hold stocks, and
pre-split institutional ownership (preinslown) is 13f institutions’ stock ownership from Thomson Financial in the calendar quarter before the split
declaration. Pre-split turnover (preturn) is the average daily turnover from month 12 to month 1 relative to the declaration month. The daily turnover
is the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day from CRSP. The pre-split number of zero daily
volumes (prezerovol) is the number of days with zero trading volume from CRSP frommonth 12 to month 1 relative to the declaration month. The pre-
split price run-up (prerunup) is the price run-up from day 120 to day 2 relative to the declaration date. We report the mean (median) values for the
whole sample, the subsamples by exchange, and the subsamples by pre-split trading discontinuity (preLM12).
Whole sample NYSE/AMEX Nasdaq preLM12Z1 preLM12o1
(N ¼ 3,721) (N ¼ 2,109) (N ¼ 1,612) (N ¼ 1,069) (N ¼ 2,652)
splitfactor 1.112 1.119 1.104 1.160 1.093
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
preprc 58.232 61.101 54.479 40.027 65.570
(50.250) (54.250) (45.395) (36.000) (57.400)
presz (106) 4550.009 5604.959 3169.804 431.226 6210.257
(640.845) (959.495) (415.216) (107.712) (1259.089)
prebm 0.373 0.438 0.287 0.502 0.321
(0.291) (0.362) (0.194) (0.428) (0.243)
preinvestor (103) 20.646 32.018 4.046 2.645 26.792
(2.766) (5.048) (1.051) (1.247) (4.148)
preinstitution 119.614 156.986 76.783 20.126 156.622
(72.000) (105.000) (47.000) (13.000) (107.000)
preinslown 0.463 0.479 0.444 0.228 0.550
(0.467) (0.497) (0.411) (0.180) (0.557)
preturn (103) 6.332 3.356 10.227 2.448 7.898
(3.007) (2.312) (6.082) (1.398) (3.883)
prezerovol 9.956 4.731 16.792 34.557 0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (12.000) (0.000)
prerunup (%) 40.262 23.760 61.853 42.950 39.179
(20.698) (15.558) (30.129) (21.382) (20.294)
5 For Gibbs estimate of Roll’s spread, we obtain the pre- and post-
split estimates from Professor Hasbrouck’s website: http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/jhasbrou/.
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especially for the less liquid subsample of ﬁrms with
preLM12  1. For the subsample of ﬁrms with preLM12o1,
the evidence of turnover increase is weak. Consistent with
Copeland (1979) and Lamoureux and Poon (1987), we ﬁnd
that the average turnover decreases after the splits for our
NYSE/AMEX subsample, although it increases for our
Nasdaq subsample. Similarly, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure shows a slight decrease in the price impact of
trades following the splits. Thus, based on turnover and
Amihud’s illiquidity measure, there is weak evidence that
stock splits improve liquidity.
In the next section, we present the results based on
LM12. As Liu (2006) argues, it can capture multiple
dimensions of liquidity and should thus be able to better
reﬂect split-induced liquidity changes.
5. Liquidity and the split factor
5.1. Evidence of liquidity improvement
We use Liu’s (2006) LM12, the standardized turn-
overadjusted number of days with zero trading volume
over 12 months, to measure liquidity. To show the effects
of stock splits on liquidity, we use two approaches. The
ﬁrst is to compare each sample ﬁrm’s pre-split LM12,
measured over month 12 through month 1 relative to
the split declaration month, and the post-split LM12,
measured over month +1 through month +12 relative to
the ex-distribution month. The second approach com-
pares each sample ﬁrm to a benchmark ﬁrm, which is a
non-split ﬁrm whose price at the end of month 1
(relative to the declaration month) is closest to that of the
split ﬁrm among all non-split ﬁrms (ordinary common
stocks) in the same size quartile and B/M quartile as the
split ﬁrm. For each split ﬁrm, we deﬁne non-split ﬁrms as
those ﬁrms that have no stock split in the window of two
years before the split ﬁrm’s split declaration date through
two years following the split ﬁrm’s split distribution.
Following Fama and French (1993), we obtain the quartile
cutoff points of ﬁrm size and of book-to-market equity
ratio based on NYSE stocks. This second approach allows
us to control for marketwide liquidity changes. Since the
two approaches produce very similar results, we report in
Table 3 only the results of the benchmark-adjusted
approach, and give a brief summary of the results of the
ﬁrst approach below.
The pre-split average LM12 is 9.94, indicating that the
average split ﬁrm has 9.94 turnover-adjusted no-trade
days in the year prior to the split. The post-split average
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Table 2
Changes in sample characteristics after stock splits.
This table reports mean (median) changes in sample characteristics following the splits. Pre-split prc is the closing price or bid/ask average from CRSP at
day 5 relative to the stock split declaration date, and post-split prc is at day 5 relative to the ex-distribution date. investor is the number of shareholders
(in 1,000 s, Compustat item 100); the pre-split estimate is obtained before the declaration month and the post-split estimate after the ex-distribution
month. institution is the number of 13f institutions, and inslown is 13f institutions’ stock ownership from Thomson Financial; the pre-split estimate is
obtained in the calendar quarter before the declaration and the post-split estimate after the ex-distribution. turnover is the average ratio of daily trading
volume to the number of shares outstanding. For 1/(12-month turnover), the 12-month turnover is the sum of daily turnover over 12 months. Roll’s Spread is
measured as
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃcovðri;t ; ri;t1Þp . Following Harris (1990), we set Roll’s spread ¼ 0 if covðri;t ; ri;t1Þ40. Following Hasbrouck (2005), we also provide Gibbs
estimates of Roll’s spread. Amihud’s IM is jri;t j=ðpi;t  voli;t Þ, where ri;t is the daily return, pi;t is the closing price or bid/ask average, and voli;t is daily volume.
For turnover, 1/(12-month turnover), Roll’s spread, and Amihud’s IM, the pre-split estimates are obtained from month 12 to month 1 relative to the
declaration month and the post-split estimates are frommonth 1 to month 12 relative to the ex-distribution month. 12-month turnover is the sum of daily
turnover over the 12 months. Stat. test reports the t-value (p-value of the signed rank tests) for testing whether the mean (median) difference between
post- and pre-split values is equal to zero.
Whole sample Subsample of preLM12Z1 Subsample of preLM12o1
Pre-Split Post-Split Stat. test Pre-Split Post-Split Stat. test Pre-Split Post-Split Stat. test
prc 58.232 29.940 170.352a *** 40.027 20.739 81.460a *** 65.570 33.648 151.515a ***
(50.250) (26.250) (o.0001)b (36.000) (19.000) (o.0001)b (57.400) (29.750) (o.0001)b
investor (103) 20.646 24.982 19.359a *** 2.645 6.893 9.096a *** 26.792 31.150 17.093a ***
(2.766) (3.500) (o.0001)b (1.247) (1.500) (o.0001)b (4.148) (5.357) (o.0001)b
institution 119.614 131.424 41.343a *** 20.126 24.501 23.090a *** 156.622 172.120 37.925a ***
(72.000) (83.000) (o.0001)b (13.000) (16.000) (o.0001)b (107.000) (123.000) (o.0001)b
inslown 0.463 0.453 2.838*** 0.228 0.234 5.451*** 0.550 0.536 5.549***
(0.467) (0.464) (0.9810) (0.180) (0.188) (o.0001) (0.557) (0.548) (o.0001)
turnover (103) 6.332 6.859 3.506*** 2.448 3.361 5.431*** 7.898 8.269 1.859*
(3.007) (3.072) (o.0001) (1.398) (1.506) (o.0001) (3.883) (3.928) (0.0474)
1/(12-month turnover) 2.230 2.147 2.546** 4.311 3.964 3.211*** 1.391 1.414 1.721*
(1.316) (1.286) (0.0330) (2.827) (2.634) (0.0010) (1.020) (1.007) (0.6985)
Roll’s Spread (%) 0.319 0.421 9.963*** 0.656 0.682 1.054 0.183 0.316 12.707***
(0.000) (0.000) (o.0001) (0.236) (0.342) (0.0168) (0.000) (0.000) (o.0001)
Gibbs (%) 0.531 0.706 21.832*** 0.815 0.978 7.371*** 0.414 0.594 26.774***
(0.356) (0.529) (o.0001) (0.494) (0.707) (o.0001) (0.324) (0.487) (o.0001)
Amihud’s IM (107) 4.954 3.159 1.998* 16.469 10.372 1.951* 0.313 0.251 2.998***
(0.206) (0.111) (o.0001) (4.876) (2.730) (o.0001) (0.064) (0.038) (o.0001)
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the t-tests.
a The t-value is based on the difference in the log post-split versus log pre-split values.
b The p-value of the signed rank test is based on the difference in the log post-split versus log pre-split values.
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LM12 is 4.94, suggesting that the split ﬁrms, on average,
experience a decrease of ﬁve no-trade days following the
splits. The average change in LM12 (chgLM12) is signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero and about 62.9% of the sample
ﬁrms experience a decrease in turnover-adjusted no-trade
days. The correlations between chgLM12 and the changes
in Roll’s spread and between chgLM12 and the changes in
the Gibbs estimate of Roll’s spread are 0.13 and 0.15,
respectively. Both correlations are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The correlation between chgLM12 and the changes
in Amihud’s illiquidity measure is stronger at 0.20. These
correlations suggest that ﬁrms with greater reduction in
no-trade days tend to experience a larger decline in Roll’s
spread and in the price impact of trades as well.
Table 3 shows that the pre-split LM12 of the sample
ﬁrms is, on average, insigniﬁcantly different from that of
the benchmark ﬁrms, indicating that prior to stock splits,
the degree of trading discontinuity of split ﬁrms is similar
to that of comparable non-split ﬁrms. Following the splits,
the average LM12 of the sample ﬁrms is lower than that of
the benchmark ﬁrms by 4.76 turnover-adjusted zero-
volume days, which is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
This suggests that the split ﬁrms have a lower incidence of
no trading than the benchmark ﬁrms in the post-split
period. Furthermore, the sample ﬁrms’ excess change in
LM12 from the pre- to post-split period (i.e., the difference
between the post-split benchmarkadjusted LM12 and
the pre-split benchmarkadjusted LM12) shows a sig-
niﬁcant decrease of 4.87 turnover-adjusted no-trade days.
The results suggest that liquidity improves following stock
splits, which is consistent with our trading continuity
improvement hypothesis.
We next use LM1 (the standardized turnover-adjusted
number of zero daily trading volumes over one month) to
illustrate and compare the pattern of trading discontinuity
for the split ﬁrms and their benchmark ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally,
Fig. 1 contrasts the pre-split average LM1 of both samples
(from month 24 through month 1 relative to the
split declaration month) and the post-split average LM1
(from month +1 through month +24 relative to the ex-
distribution month). It illustrates that the post-split average
LM1 of the split ﬁrms is lower than their pre-split average
LM1. It also shows that the post-split average LM1 of the
split ﬁrms is lower than that of their benchmark ﬁrms.
Furthermore, the picture reveals that the effects of stock
splits on reducing trading discontinuity are long term,
lasting at least 24 months after the splits. Therefore, the
liquidity improvement following stock splits is not a short-
term or a transitory phenomenon.
Table 3 also provides the subsample results by pre-split
liquidity. The 1,069 sample ﬁrms with preLM12  1 have
8.39 more turnover-adjusted no-trade days, on average,
than their benchmark ﬁrms before the splits; after the
splits, they have 9.21 fewer turnover-adjusted no-trade
days than their benchmark ﬁrms. Thus, on average, the
subsample ﬁrms experience a signiﬁcant excess reduction
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 3
The effect of stock splits on trading continuity.
This table reports the effects of stock splits on trading discontinuity, measured by Liu’s (2006) LM12, the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero
daily trading volumes over 12 months, which is deﬁned as






Number of zero daily volumes in 12 months is the number of days with zero trading volume over the 12 months. 12-month turnover is the sum of daily
turnover over the 12 months. Deﬂator is set at 11,000 such that 0o 1=ð12-month turnoverÞDeflator o1 for each stock (Liu, 2006). NoTD is the number of trading days in
the market over the 12 months. Pre-split measure (preLM12), post-split measure (postLM12), and change in LM12 (chgLM12) are the benchmark-adjusted
measures (the difference between a split ﬁrm’s LM12 and that of its benchmark ﬁrm). Pre-split LM12 is frommonth 12 to month 1 relative to the stock
split declaration month, and post-split LM12 is from month 1 to month 12 relative to the stock split ex-distribution month. The excess change in trading
continuity (chgLM12) is the difference between the benchmark-adjusted postLM12 and preLM12. For each split ﬁrm, we choose a benchmark ﬁrm that is a
non-split ﬁrm whose price at the end of month 1 (relative to the declaration month) is closest to that of the split ﬁrm among all non-split ﬁrms in the
same size quartile and B/M quartile as the split ﬁrm. The t-values in parentheses assume independence across ﬁrms; and in the brackets are the t-values














preLM12 0.109 8.396*** 2.898*** 0.248 3.210 8.245*
(0.21) (4.73) (9.82) (0.46) (1.36) (1.95)
[0.19] [4.47] [9.82] [0.45] [1.33] [1.41]
postLM12 4.765*** 9.219*** 3.149*** 4.529*** 7.083*** 8.602*
(10.11) (5.99) (10.14) (9.41) (3.25) (2.00)
[9.63] [5.77] [10.09] [8.81] [3.34] [1.95]
chgLM12 4.874*** 17.615*** 0.251** 4.281*** 10.294*** 16.848***
(15.39) (16.94) (2.26) (13.83) (6.07) (3.36)
[13.92] [15.95] [2.34] [12.65] [6.58] [2.82]
Proportion of stocks with
chgLM12o0
0.513 0.812 0.404 0.506 0.567 0.705
(p-value)a (o.0001) (o.0001) (o.0001) (o.0001) (o.0001) (o.0001)
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for the t-tests.
a The p-value is based on the signed rank test for the null hypothesis that chgLM12 ¼ 0.
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of 17.61 (t-value ¼ 16.94) turnover-adjusted no-trade
days, compared to their counterparts.
Similarly, the average ﬁrm in the preLM12o1 sub-
sample experiences a signiﬁcant excess reduction of 0.25
(t-value ¼ 2.26) in LM12 following the splits, relative to
their benchmark ﬁrms. Thus, the more actively traded
subsample also shows a signiﬁcant reduction in trading
discontinuity following the splits.
We also examine the subsample results by split factor.
As the split factor increases from one to between one and
two, and then to higher than two, the average number of
turnoveradjusted no-trade days prior to the splits rises
from 8.92 to 17.99, and then to 34.60, respectively. The
numbers imply that ﬁrms appear to choose a higher split
factor when their stocks face more frequent trading
discontinuities.
On average, following the splits, the sample ﬁrms with
a split factor equal to one experience an excess reduction
of 4.28 days of turnover-adjusted no-trade days (excess
with respect to their benchmark ﬁrms). The excess
reduction is more pronounced—an average decrease of
10.29 days—for the sample stocks with a split factor
between one and two, and the excess reduction further
increases to 16.84 days for the sample stocks with a split
factor greater than two. The excess reductions in LM12 for
the three groups are all statistically signiﬁcant. The results
suggest that ﬁrms choosing a higher split factor seem to
experience more trading continuity improvement follow-
ing the splits.
Thus, our results from the subsample analyses are
consistent with the trading continuity improvement
hypothesis. We next use cross-sectional regression ana-
lyses to further investigate whether pre-split trading
discontinuity is one of the determinants of the split factor,
and also to check the robustness of our ﬁnding that
choosing a higher split factor leads to a greater trading
continuity improvement.
5.2. Is pre-split liquidity a determinant of the split factor?
Our trading continuity improvement hypothesis argues
that ﬁrms whose stocks have higher LM12, i.e., a greater
incidence of no trading, could use a higher split factor to
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Fig. 1. Pre-split and post-split LM1 of the split ﬁrms vs. their benchmark ﬁrms.
This ﬁgure plots the pre-split average LM1 frommonth 24 to 1 relative to the stock split declaration month and the post-split average LM1 frommonth
1 to 24 relative to the ex-distribution month for the split ﬁrms and their benchmark ﬁrms. For each split ﬁrm, we choose a benchmark ﬁrm that is a non-
split ﬁrm whose price at the end of month 1 (relative to the declaration month) is closest to that of the split ﬁrm among all non-split ﬁrms in the same
size quartile and B/M quartile as the split ﬁrm. LM1 is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over one month (Liu,
2006). The estimate is







Number of zero daily volumes in one month is the number of days with zero trading volume over one month. One-month turnover is the sum of daily
turnover over the month. Daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day.




for each stock (Liu, 2006). NoTD is the number of trading days in the market over the month.
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attract more trading from uninformed investors. The
hypothesis thus predicts that, ceteris paribus, the split
factor is positively related to pre-split LM12.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) and So and Tse (2000)
argue that managers choose a split factor to return the
price level to a ‘‘preferred’’ range. This implies that the
higher the pre-split price, the higher the split factor must
be to return the price level to a certain range. Further-
more, Dyl and Elliott (2006) argue that lower share prices
are a characteristic of ﬁrms owned by so-called small
investors, and that higher share prices are a characteristic
of large ﬁrms. Their argument suggests that, holding other
things constant, large ﬁrms would choose a smaller split
factor.
To test our hypothesis that pre-split liquidity is a
determinant of the split factor, we use the following
regression model:
splitfactori ¼ a0 þ a1preLM12i þ a2lnpreprci þ a3lnpreszi
þ a4lnprebmi þ a5prerunupi þ a6lnpreinvestori
þ a7lnpreinslowni þ a8exchdummyi þ ei (1)
The dependent variable, splitfactor, is the number of
additional shares issued per old shares. The model allows
us to test the relation between splitfactor and preLM12,
which is the pre-split LM12 from month 12 to month 1
relative to the declaration month, while controlling for the
following variables: lnpreprc, the log value of pre-split
stock price; lnpresz, the log value of pre-split market
capitalization; lnprebm, the log value of pre-split book-to-
market equity ratio at day 5 relative to the stock split
declaration date; prerunup, the pre-split stock price run-
up from days 120 to 2 before the split declaration day
(see Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman, 1984); lnpreinvestor,
the log value of the pre-split number of shareholders
before the declaration month; lnpreinslown, the log
value of the pre-split institutional share ownership in
the calendar quarter before the split declaration;
and exchdummy, an indicator variable for the exchange
listing, which is equal to one if the sample stock is
listed on Nasdaq and zero otherwise. We have also
considered lnpreinsl, the log value of the number of
institutional investors, and found that it has no signiﬁcant
effect. Furthermore, it has a correlation of 0.91 with log
ﬁrm size, lnpresz. To avoid multicollinearity, we do not
include it in our set of control variables. Of the 3,721
sample ﬁrms, 3,164 have all these control variables
available for the regression analysis. Table 4 reports the
regression results.
According to model 1 in the table, the split factor is
signiﬁcantly and positively related to preLM12. Thus, the
regression results are consistent with our hypothesis that,
ceteris paribus, ﬁrms choose a higher split factor when
their stocks face more frequent trading discontinuities.
Model 1 also shows that the split factor is signiﬁcantly
and positively related to the pre-split price level and the
book-to-market equity ratio, but negatively related to ﬁrm
size, the pre-split price run-up, and institutional share
ownership. Thus, holding other things constant, larger
ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher institutional ownership tend
to choose a lower split factor to maintain a higher target
price level, which is consistent with Dyl and Elliott’s
(2006) observation noted above.
Model 2 in Table 4 examines the subsample relation
between the split factor and pre-split liquidity. We set
preLM12_D1 ¼ preLM12 if preLM12  1, otherwise pre-
LM12_D1 ¼ 0; and preLM12_D0 ¼ preLM12 if preLM12o1,
otherwise preLM12_D0 ¼ 0.
It follows that preLM12 ¼ preLM12_D1+preLM12_D0.
The results indicate that the pre-split liquidity level is a
determinant of the split factor only for the less liquid
ﬁrms. The ﬁnding is reasonable because, for the ﬁrms that
have trades every day, illiquidity is not an imminent
problem. Consequently, for the preLM12o1 subsample,
the pre-split liquidity level is not important in setting the
split factor. Conversely, the less liquid ﬁrms, which face
greater illiquidity, choose a higher split factor.
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Table 4
Cross-sectional analysis of the split factor.
This table reports the cross-sectional relation between the split factor
(splitfactor, the number of additional shares per old share issued) and
pre-split liquidity (preLM12, the pre-split LM12 from month 12 to
month 1 relative to the declaration month). For the subsample
relations, we set preLM12_D1 ¼ preLM12 if preLM12Z1, otherwise
preLM12_D1 ¼ 0; and preLM12_D0 ¼ preLM12 if preLM12o1, otherwise
preLM12_D0 ¼ 0. We control for ﬁrm characteristics, including lnpreprc,
the log pre-split stock price; lnpresz, the log pre-split market capitaliza-
tion; lnprebm, the log pre-split book-to-market equity ratio at day 5
relative to the declaration date; prerunup, the pre-split price run-up from
day 120 to day 2 relative to the declaration date; lnpreinvestor, the log
pre-split investor base before the declaration month; lnpreinslown, the
log pre-split institutional share ownership in the calendar quarter before
the split declaration; and exchdummy, an indicator variable equal to one
if the sample stock is listed on the Nasdaq, and zero otherwise. The t-

























Adj. R2 0.1907 0.1910
N 3,164 3,164
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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5.3. The relation between changes in liquidity and the
split factor
If ﬁrms facing more frequent trading discontinuities
tend to choose a higher split factor, does doing so lead to
greater post-split liquidity improvement? To answer this
question, we use the following cross-sectional regression
analysis:
chgLM12i ¼ b0 þ b1splitfactori þ b2preLM12i þ b3lnpreprci
þ b4lnpreszi þ b5lnprebmi þ b6prerunupi
þ b7lnpreinvestori þ b8lnchginvestori
þ b9lnpreinslowni þ b10exchdummyi þ di (2)
The dependent variable, chgLM12, is the difference between
post- and pre-split LM12. While our focus is on the relation
between chgLM12 and splitfactor, we are also interested in
exploring which types of ﬁrms have more liquidity
improvement from stock splits. In addition to the seven
ﬁrm characteristic variables in Eq. (1), Eq. (2) includes
lnchginvestor, the difference between the log post-split
number of shareholders and the log pre-split number of
investors, which allows us to check the extent to which the
increase in investor base contributes to liquidity improve-
ment. The equation also includes preLM12, with which we
expect to measure the extent to which less liquid ﬁrms
experience greater liquidity improvement.
Table 5 reports the regression results. Model 1 shows
that chgLM12 is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to
splitfactor, indicating that a greater reduction in turnover-
adjusted no-trade days is associated with a higher split
factor. Model 2 shows that the relation holds for both
subsamples by preLM12. Thus, consistent with the trading
continuity improvement hypothesis, ﬁrms choosing a higher
split factor experience greater liquidity improvement.
The regression results also reveal that chgLM12 is
signiﬁcantly and positively related to lnpreprc, but
negatively related to preLM12, lnpresz, and prerunup. This
suggests that larger ﬁrms, ﬁrms with a lower pre-split
price level, and ﬁrms with a higher pre-split price run-
up—and especially higher pre-split trading discontinuity—
experience greater liquidity improvement following the splits.
However, contrary to our expectation, lnchginvestor is
insigniﬁcant, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the extent of
liquidity improvement is not related to the increase in
investor base. Notice that the way we measure chgLM12
focuses on the long-term effects of trading—from one year
before to one year after the splits—which excludes the
effects of short-term trading from the split announcement
month to the ex-distribution month. This focus allows us to
minimize the short-term effects of information contained in
the split announcement and any ex-distribution effects on
trading. It is possible that the trading contributed by the
increase in investor base occurs largely during this short
period, and thus is not picked up by chgLM12.
6. Changes in liquidity risk
The trading continuity improvement hypothesis as-
serts that as stock splits attract more uninformed
investors to participate in trading, market makers could
provide liquidity services at lower costs, which increases
investors’ propensity to trade. This improvement in the
liquidity environment would make stock prices more
resilient and less subject to impact from shocks to market
liquidity. Consequently, investors would face lower
liquidity risk and require a lower liquidity premium,
which in turn leads to a lower cost of equity capital for the
split ﬁrms. In this section, we test this prediction on
changes in liquidity risk.
6.1. Evidence of a reduction in liquidity risk
Liu (2006) proposes a two-factor liquidity-augmented
CAPM (LCAPM) in which, in addition to the market
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Table 5
Cross-sectional analysis of changes in liquidity.
This table reports the cross-sectional relation between chgLM12, the
difference between log post-split LM12 and log pre-split LM12, and
splitfactor. For the subsample relations, we set splitfactor_D1 ¼ splitfactor
if preLM12Z1, otherwise splitfactor_D1 ¼ 0; and splitfactor_D0 ¼ splitfac-
tor if preLM12o1, otherwise splitfactor_D0 ¼ 0. We include a set of
control variables, including preLM12, the log pre-split LM12 from month
12 to month 1 relative to the declaration month; lnpreprc, the log pre-
split stock price; lnpresz, the log pre-split market capitalization; lnprebm,
the log pre-split book-to-market equity ratio at day 5 relative to the
declaration date; prerunup, the pre-split price run-up from day 120 to
day 2 relative to the declaration date; lnpreinvestor, the log pre-split
investor base before the declaration month; lnpreinslown, the log pre-
split institutional share ownership in the calendar quarter before the
split declaration; and exchdummy, an indicator variable equal to one if
the sample stock is listed on the Nasdaq and zero otherwise. Also
included is lnchginvestor, the difference between the log post-split
number of shareholders and the log pre-split number of investors. The t-





























Adj. R2 0.6681 0.6739
N 3,130 3,130
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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portfolio, stock returns are also related to a mimicking
liquidity factor, LIQ. Similar to Fama and French’s (1996)
size factor, SMB, and B/M factor, HML, LIQ is the return
difference between a low-liquidity portfolio (containing
stocks with high LM12) and a high-liquidity portfolio
(containing stocks with low LM12).6 Speciﬁcally, the
LCAPM posits that the expected excess return on stock i
can be expressed as
EðriÞ  rf ¼ bim½EðrmÞ  rf  þ bilEðLIQ Þ, (3)
where EðrmÞ is the expected return on the market portfolio,
EðLIQÞ is the expected value of the mimicking liquidity
factor, and bim and bil are ﬁrm i’s factor loadings. As Liu
(2006) demonstrates, this two-factor LCAPM performs
better than Fama and French’s (1996) three-factor model
and Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) asset pricing model in
explaining the cross-section of stock returns.7 In particular,
while the LCAPM can explain the size and the B/M effects,
both the Fama-French and the Pastor-Stambaugh models
cannot explain the liquidity premium associated with
ﬁrms with high LM12. The LCAPM can also explain
anomalies associated with the cash-ﬂow-to-price ratio,
dividend yield, earnings-to-price ratio, and long-term
contrarian investment strategies, as shown by Liu (2006).
Thus, given its usefulness in explaining the cross-
section of stock returns, we use Liu’s LCAPM to measure
the liquidity risk of each split ﬁrm and also to examine
how it changes from before to after a stock split. First, we
run the following time-series regression for each split
ﬁrm:
rit  rft ¼ ai;0 þ ai;1Dt þ ðbim;0 þ bim;1DtÞðrmt;i  rft;iÞ
þ ðbil;0 þ bil;1DtÞLIQt;i þ it , (4)
where rit is the monthly return of split ﬁrm i at time t; rft
is the risk-free rate at time t; Dt ¼ 1 if t is in the post-split
period and Dt ¼ 0 otherwise; bim;0 and bil;0 are the pre-
split factor loadings on the market portfolio and the
liquidity factor, respectively; bim;1 and bil;1 are the
differences between the post- and pre-split factor load-
ings on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor,
respectively; ai;0 is the pre-split abnormal return; and ai;1
is the difference between the post- and pre-split abnormal
return. To avoid the announcement effect, the ex-date
effect, and potential information leakage prior to the split,
we run the regression in Eq. (4) for each ﬁrm for t from
month 24 to month 2 prior to the split declaration
month and from month +2 to month +24 after the ex-
distribution month.
Next, we use the benchmark-adjusted return as the
dependent variable and re-run the regression for each
split ﬁrm, i.e.,
rit  rbit ¼ ai;0 þ ai;1Dt þ ðbim;0 þ bim;1DtÞðrmt;i  rft;iÞ
þ ðbil;0 þ bil;1DtÞLIQt;i þ it , (5)
where rbit is the monthly return of split ﬁrm i’s benchmark
ﬁrm, ai;0 and ai;1 are ﬁrm i’s excess alphas (excess with
respect to the benchmark ﬁrm), and bim;0, bil;0, bim;1, and
bil;1 are its excess betas. For each split ﬁrm, we again
choose a benchmark ﬁrm that is a non-split ﬁrm whose
price at the end of month 1 (relative to the declaration
month) is closest to that of the split ﬁrm among all non-
split ﬁrms in the same size quartile and B/M quartile as
the split ﬁrm. This benchmark-adjusted approach allows
us to mitigate the effects of possible marketwide move-
ments in liquidity risk.
Table 6 reports both estimation results. To ensure that
our factor loadings are estimated with sufﬁcient observa-
tions, we exclude ﬁrms that have fewer than 12 (non-
missing) monthly returns available in either the pre-split
or the post-split period. For the whole sample, the average
of the ai;0 estimates is 3.12%, which is consistent with
earlier ﬁndings of price run-ups prior to the splits. While
the average of the pre-split market beta bim;0 is 1.0417, the
mean of the pre-split liquidity beta is 0.1302. On
average, the split ﬁrms have higher pre-split market betas
than the benchmark ﬁrms by 0.1258. The average excess
bil;0 is insigniﬁcantly different from zero, suggesting that,
on average, the split ﬁrms and their benchmark ﬁrms
have similar pre-split liquidity betas. After the splits,
however, the split ﬁrms experience a signiﬁcant reduction
in liquidity risk—the average bil;1 is 0.2624 (t-value ¼
7.05) and the average excess bil;1 is 0.3343 (t-value ¼
7.22). For the whole sample, 56.0% of the split ﬁrms
show excess bil;1o0. For the preLM12  1 subsample,
59.4% of the ﬁrms have excess bil;1o0 and for the
preLM12o1 subsample, 54.8% of the ﬁrms exhibit excess
bil;1o0. The results indicate that the majority of the
sample ﬁrms, relative to their benchmark ﬁrms, experi-
ence a reduction in liquidity beta. The results are thus
consistent with our trading continuity improvement
hypothesis, which posits that as stock splits improve the
liquidity environment, investors face lower liquidity risk.
Note that, to adjust for possible dependence in the bil;1
estimates across ﬁrms, we sort and average the estimates
by ex-date in calendar time (e.g., if two ﬁrms have the
same ex-date, we average their bil;1) to obtain a time series
of bil;1 estimates. Then, following Fama and French (2002),
we obtain the autoregressive error correction standard
error of the mean, assuming that the errors (i.e., the
deviations from the mean) of the bil;1 estimates follow an
AR(1) process. We do the same autoregressive error
correction for the other regression coefﬁcients. In most
cases, the AR(1) parameters are indeed signiﬁcantly
negative and, after the correction, the Durbin-Watson
statistics are equal to 2.0, suggesting no more ﬁrst-order
correlation. For comparison, Table 6 also includes t-values
under the assumption that the coefﬁcient estimates are
independent across ﬁrms.
The effects of stock splits on market betas are margin-
al. The average bim;1 is 0.0637 (t-value ¼ 1.86), and the
average excess bim;1 is 0.0793 (t-value ¼ 1.73). The
results suggest that liquidity improvement also leads to a
slight reduction in market betas, which implies that the
reduction in liquidity risk following the splits is not offset
by the change in market betas. Scholes and Williams
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6 We thank Liu for providing us his liquidity factor, LIQ. For the
detailed construction of LIQ, see Liu (2006, pp. 650–651).
7 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest that liquidity risk can be
measured by return sensitivity to market liquidity. However, their measure
does not capture the liquidity risk stemming from trading discontinuity;
instead, it captures the illiquidity related to price impacts of trades.
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(1977) show that CAPM beta estimates are biased down-
ward for infrequently traded stocks and biased upward for
stocks traded very frequently. Our results show that
trading continuity improves following the splits, suggest-
ing that the market beta estimates should increase
following the splits if the ‘‘true’’ market betas do not
change. Instead, we ﬁnd that the market beta estimates
slightly decrease. It is possible that the slight decrease in
the average market beta is simply due to a mean-reverting
tendency (see, e.g., Blume, 1975).
How much would the cost of equity capital be reduced
for the split ﬁrms because investors face lower liquidity
risk and require a lower liquidity premium? Since we use
monthly data, we estimate the cost of equity capital
reduction per annum by compounding bil;1EðLIQ Þ for 12
months. During the sample period from 1975 through
2004, E(LIQ) is about 0.76% per month, which is very
similar to Liu’s estimate (2006, Table 5) of a monthly
mean of LIQ over 1964–2003 of 0.749%. Thus, an average
split-induced reduction in liquidity risk by 0.2624 trans-
lates into an average reduction of 2.42 percentage points
per annum in the cost of equity capital for the split ﬁrms.
This is a sizable reduction—a 17.3% reduction in the cost of
equity capital—because the average pre-split cost of
equity capital of the split ﬁrms is about 13.99% per annum
(by Eq. (3), we have rf ¼ 0:49%, EðrmÞ  rf ¼ 0:678%, and
EðLIQ Þ ¼ 0:76%).
Fig. 2 illustrates the month-by-month liquidity risk
estimates from month 24 prior to the stock split
declaration month to month +24 after the ex-distribution
month for the split ﬁrms and for their benchmark ﬁrms.
Following Ball and Kothari (1989), we obtain the month-
by-month liquidity risk estimates by running a cross-
sectional regression,
rit  rft ¼ at þ bm;tðrmt;i  rft;iÞ þ bl;tLIQt;i þ it , (6)
for each event month. The process allows us to obtain an
aggregate measure of liquidity risk bl;t in each event
month t for the sample ﬁrms and for their benchmark
ﬁrms. As Ball and Kothari (1989) point out, the advantage
of the technique is to measure risks, which can shift
during the event period. Fig. 2 shows that (1) the post-
split liquidity risk estimates of the split ﬁrms are lower
than their pre-split estimates, and (2) while the pre-split
liquidity risk estimates of the split ﬁrms are not much
different from those of the benchmark ﬁrms, the split
ﬁrms’ post-split liquidity risk estimates are lower than
their counterparts’ estimates. Thus, the cross-sectional,
month-by-month liquidity estimates conﬁrm our time-
series, ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm liquidity risk estimates.
6.2. Would ﬁrms with no zero-volume days beneﬁt from
stock splits?
One might still be concerned about the following
question: Would more liquid ﬁrms (e.g., those with no
zero-volume days) beneﬁt from stock splits? To address
this question, we examine the changes in liquidity risk in
the preLM12 subsamples.
As shown in Panel B of Table 6, the average pre-split
market beta of the high- trading-discontinuity ﬁrms is
1.0975, which is slightly higher than 1.0192 for the low-
trading-discontinuity subsample. As expected, the two
subsamples have very different pre-split liquidity betas:
0.4058 (t-value ¼ 7.64) for the ﬁrms with high pre-split
trading discontinuity versus 0.3459 (t-value ¼ 12.36)
for those with low pre-split trading discontinuity. This is
consistent with the notion that investors face high
(low) liquidity risk in ﬁrms with high (low) trading
discontinuity.
Interestingly, both subsamples experience signiﬁcant
reductions in liquidity risk following the splits. The
reduction is greater for the high-trading-discontinuity
subsample—the average bil;1 is 0.4696 (t-value ¼ 6.72)
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Table 6
Changes in liquidity risk.
This table reports the results of the following time-series regression,
which is run for each split ﬁrm for t from month 24 to month 2 prior
to the split declaration month and frommonth +2 to month +24 after the
ex-distribution month:
rit  rft ¼ ai;0 þ ai;1Dt þ ðbim;0 þ bim;1DtÞðrmt;i  rft;iÞ
þ ðbil;0 þ bil;1DtÞLIQt;i þ it ; ð4Þ
where Dt ¼ 1 if t is in the post-split period, and Dt ¼ 0 otherwise; bim,0
and bil,0 are the pre-split betas on the market portfolio and the liquidity
factor, respectively; bim,1 and bil,1 are the differences between the post-
and pre-split betas on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor,
respectively; ai,0 is the pre-split abnormal return; and ai,1 is the
difference between the post- and pre-split abnormal return. We also
report the results of the regression that replaces dependent variable
ritrft by ritrbit, the benchmark-adjusted return. In this case, the results
show ﬁrm i’s excess a’s and b’s over its benchmark ﬁrm. To ensure that
our factor loadings are estimated with sufﬁcient observations, we
exclude from the report ﬁrms that have fewer than 12 (non-missing)
monthly returns available in either the pre-split or the post-split period.
The t-values in parentheses assume independence across ﬁrms; and in
the brackets are the t-values with autoregressive error correction
standard error, assuming that the errors (i.e., the deviations from the
mean) of the coefﬁcient estimates follow an AR(1) process.
Panel A: The whole sample (N ¼ 3,706)
Dependent
variable
ai,0 ai,1 bim,0 bim,1 bil,0 bil,1
ritrft 0.0312 0.0252 1.0417 0.0637 0.1302 0.2624
(51.20) (32.93) (49.03) (2.32) (5.06) (8.19)
[40.98] [29.46] [40.38] [1.86] [3.73] [7.05]
ritrbit 0.0165 0.0091 0.1258 0.0793 0.0093 0.3343
(22.05) (9.13) (4.85) (2.21) (0.29) (8.16)
[20.39] [8.63] [4.38] [1.73] [0.63] [7.22]
Panel B: Subsample results by pre-split trading discontinuity
preLM12Z1 (N ¼ 1,063)
ritrft 0.0246 0.0217 1.0975 0.1191 0.4058 0.4696
(24.16) (15.68) (24.39) (2.18) (7.64) (6.72)
[21.96] [14.88] [24.23] [2.09] [7.51] [6.51]
ritrbit 0.0095 0.0041 0.1889 0.0252 0.4009 0.4913
(6.99) (2.12) (3.31) (0.34) (6.00) (5.75)
[6.77] [1.97] [3.32] [0.39] [5.47] [6.04]
preLM12o1 (N ¼ 2,643)
ritrft 0.0339 0.0267 1.0192 0.0414 0.3459 0.1790
(45.51) (29.03) (43.09) (1.31) (12.36) (5.12)
[36.67] [25.49] [34.86] [1.28] [9.54] [4.71]
ritrbit 0.0189 0.0109 0.1032 0.0986 0.1560 0.2781
(21.44) (9.38) (3.59) (2.40) (4.40) (5.99)
[19.75] [8.90] [3.36] [2.23] [3.98] [5.24]
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and the average excess bil;1 is 0.4913 (t-value ¼ 5.75).
For the low-trading-discontinuity subsample, the average
bil;1 is 0.1790 (t-value ¼ 5.12) and the average excess
bil;1 is 0.2781 (t-value ¼ 5.99). Thus, while less liquid
ﬁrms exhibit greater reduction in liquidity risk, stock
splits also lower liquidity risk for the relatively more
liquid ﬁrms that have trades every day prior to the splits.
For the latter group, the liquidity risk reduction could be
due to the fact that stock splits bring in more small,
uninformed trades, as Schultz (2000) and Easley, O’Hara,
and Saar (2001) show, and reduce the possibility of
intraday trading discontinuity.
For the high-trading-discontinuity subsample, the
average reduction of 0.4696 in liquidity beta translates
into an average reduction of 4.37% points per annum in
the cost of equity, which is about 21.7% of the group’s pre-
split average cost of equity capital of 20.16% per annum.
Similarly, for the low-trading-discontinuity subsample,
the reduction of 0.1790 in liquidity risk translates into a
reduction of 1.6 percentage points per annum, or about
13.8% of the group’s pre-split average cost of equity capital
of 11.59% per annum. Thus, by reducing the liquidity risk
that investors face, stock splits generate substantial
beneﬁts for the ﬁrms. While less liquid ﬁrms beneﬁt
more from stock splits, ﬁrms that have trades every day
beneﬁt as well.
6.3. Liquidity improvement and liquidity risk reduction
What contributes to the liquidity risk reduction?
According to our trading continuity improvement hypoth-
esis, liquidity risk reduction should be related to liquidity
improvement, as measured by chgLM12. We are also
interested in knowing whether a larger investor base
could provide better protection against shocks to market
liquidity, thus reducing liquidity risk. To explore these
relations, we use the following regression:
bil;1 ¼ g0 þ g1lnchgLM12i þ g2lnchginvestori þ g3splitfactori
þ g4lnpreprci þ g5lnpreszi þ g6lnprebmi þ g7prerunupi
þ g8exchdummyi þ xi (7)
where bil;1 is ﬁrm i’s excess change in liquidity risk (excess
with respect to its benchmark ﬁrm) and lnchgLM12i is its
excess change in LM12. Note that lnchgLM12 ¼ log(1+
postLM12)log(1+preLM12). We also use the split ﬁrm’s
change in LM12 and change in liquidity beta in the
regression (7), and obtain similar results. Our experiments
show that lnchgLM12 performs slightly better than
chgLM12 ¼ postLM12preLM12 in the regression. Also,
we have experimented to include lnpreinvestor and
lnpreinslown into the regression, and found that they are
insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, with them in the model, the
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Fig. 2. Pre-Split and post-split liquidity risk of the split ﬁrms vs. their benchmark ﬁrms.
This ﬁgure plots the pre-split liquidity risk estimates from month 24 to 1 relative to the stock split declaration month and the post-split liquidity risk
estimates from month 1 to 24 relative to the ex-distribution month for the split ﬁrms and their benchmark ﬁrms. For each split ﬁrm, we choose a
benchmark ﬁrm that is a non-split ﬁrmwhose price at the end of month 1 (relative to the declaration month) is closest to that of the split ﬁrm among all
non-split ﬁrms in the same size quartile and B/M quartile as the split ﬁrm.
Following Ball and Kothari (1989), we obtain the month-by-month liquidity risk estimates by running a cross-sectional regression,
rit  rft ¼ at þ bm;tðrmt;i  rft;iÞ þ bl;tLIQt;i þ it ð6Þ
for each event month in the pre-split period and in the post-split period. The process allows us to obtain an aggregate measure of liquidity risk, bl;t , in each
event month t for the sample ﬁrms and their benchmark ﬁrms. As Ball and Kothari (1989) point out, the advantage of the technique is to measure risks,
which can shift during the event period.
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overall ﬁt of the regression, in terms of adjusted R2,
declines and lnchgLM12 becomes less signiﬁcant. For these
reasons, we do not include them in Eq. (7).
Table 7 reports the regression results. Model 1 shows
that bil;1 is positively and signiﬁcantly related to
lnchgLM12, suggesting that the splits that induce more
liquidity improvement have more liquidity risk reduction.
However, bil;1 is insigniﬁcantly related to lnchginvestor,
which implies that the reduction in liquidity risk follow-
ing the splits is not related to changes in the investor base.
In model 2, we decompose lnchgLM12 into
lnchgLM12_D1 and lnchgLM12_D0, and similarly lnchgin-
vestor into lnchginvestor_D1 and lnchginvestor_D0, for
examining the subsample relations.8 The results show
that the liquidity risk reduction is signiﬁcantly related to
the liquidity improvement in both the preLM12  1 and
preLM12o1 subsamples. Again, changes in liquidity risk
are not related to changes in the investor base in either
subsample.
We next turn to the split announcement effect on stock
returns and test whether the announcement returns are
correlated with changes in liquidity levels and changes in
liquidity risk.
7. Split announcement returns and
liquidity improvements
Wemeasure stock price reactions, adjusted for market-
wide movements, over the three days surrounding the
split declaration date (day 0) as the split announcement

















where RETi;t is the return on ﬁrm i on day t, RETbi;t is its
benchmark ﬁrm’s return on day t, and MKTRETt is the
return on day t on the CRSP value-weighted market
portfolio, including NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks. Since the
results are virtually the same, our discussion focuses on
the benchmark-adjusted returns.
Consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd that the
market responds positively to the split announce-
ment—the average three-day benchmark-adjusted return
for our sample of 3,721 stock splits over days 1 to +1 is a
signiﬁcant 3.30%. The average three-day market-adjusted
return is 3.28%, which is also signiﬁcantly different from
zero. This split announcement return is similar to those
found in previous studies (see, e.g., Grinblatt, Masulis, and
Titman, 1984; Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996).
For the ﬁrms with preLM12  1, the average excess
return is 4.88%, which is signiﬁcantly larger than the
average excess return of 2.73% for the ﬁrms with
preLM12o1. The results suggest that the market response
to the split announcement is much stronger for less
liquid ﬁrms.
Next, we examine whether the benchmark-adjusted
announcement return is related to the excess change in
the liquidity level, as measured by lnchgLM12, and to the
excess change in liquidity risk, as estimated by bil;1 from
Eq. (5), using the following regression:
annBARi ¼ a0 þ a1lnchgLM12i þ a2bil;1 þ a3splitfactori þ a4lnpreprci
þ a5lnpreszi þ a6lnprebmi þ a7prerunupi þ a8lnpreLM12i
þ a8bil;0 þ a9lnchginvestori þ a10lnpreinslowni þ ui ð8)
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Table 7
Cross-sectional analysis of changes in liquidity risk.
This table reports the results of regressing bil,1, the excess change in
liquidity risk, from Eq. (5), on lnchgLM12, the excess change in LM12 (the
difference between benchmark-adjusted log (1+postLM12) and bench-
mark-adjusted log (1+preLM12)), and lnchginvestor, the change in the log
(number of shareholders) following the splits, controlling for ﬁrm
characteristics. For the subsample relations, we set lnchgLM12_D1 ¼
lnchgLM12 if preLM12Z1, otherwise lnchgLM12_D1 ¼ 0; and
lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ lnchgLM12 if preLM12o1, otherwise lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ 0.
Similarly, lnchginvestor_D1 ¼ lnchginvestor if preLM12Z1, otherwise
lnchginvestor_D1 ¼ 0; and lnchginvestor_D0 ¼ lnchginvestor if pre-






























Adj. R2 0.0166 0.0172
N 3,017 3,017
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
8 lnchgLM12_D1 ¼ lnchgLM12 if preLM12Z1, otherwise lnchgLM12_
D1 ¼ 0; and lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ lnchgLM12 if preLM12o1, otherwise
lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ 0. Similarly, lnchginvestor_D1 ¼ lnchginvestor if
(footnote continued)
preLM12Z1, otherwise lnchginvestor_D1 ¼ 0; and lnchginvestor_
D0 ¼ lnchginvestor if preLM12o1, otherwise lnchginvestor_D0 ¼ 0.
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Note that many of the explanatory variables on the
right-hand side of Eq. (8) have been shown in prior
research to affect split announcement returns. For
example, the split factor (splitfactor) has been examined
as a proxy for the strength of the signal by Brennan and
Copeland (1988), Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984),
and McNichols and Dravid (1990). The book-to-market
equity ratio (lnprebm) and ﬁrm size (lnpresz) have been
examined by Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) as
cross-sectional determinants of split announcement re-
turns. The pre-split price run-up (prerunup) is used by
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) as a proxy for the
extent to which the stock price is away from its normal
trading range. The change in investor base (lnchginvestor)
has been examined by Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997)
and Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999). And institu-
tional share ownership (lnpreinslown) has been studied by
Dennis and Strickland (2003). We control for these
variables in testing the relations between annBAR and
lnchgLM12 and bil;1.
Table 8 reports the regression results. Model 1 shows
that annBAR is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to both
lnchgLM12 and bil;1, indicating that the split announce-
ment return is indeed more positive for the ﬁrms with a
greater decrease in no-trade days and a greater reduction
in the liquidity beta following their stock splits. The
evidence is consistent with our trading continuity im-
provement hypothesis, and implies that investors are
concerned with stock illiquidity and liquidity risk and
reward ﬁrms that split their stocks to improve liquidity
and to reduce liquidity risk.
For the subsample relations, model 2 reveals that the
negative relation between annBAR and lnchgLM12 holds
only in the preLM12  1 subsample, but the negative
relation between annBAR and bil;1 holds only in the
preLM12o1 subsample. Thus, lnchgLM12 has a signiﬁcant
valuation effect for the less liquid subsample in which there
is a signiﬁcant reduction in no-trade days. But it has an
insigniﬁcant valuation effect for the relatively liquid
subsample in which illiquidity is not an imminent problem.
Conversely, the liquidity risk reduction has a signiﬁcant
valuation effect only for the preLM12o1 subsample.
For a robustness check, Table 8 also includes the results
of using the market-adjusted announcement return,
annMARi, as the dependent variable in Eq. (8) with
lnchgLM12 as the change in liquidity level and bil;1 as the
change in liquidity risk from Eq. (4). The inferences are
essentially the same. Nevertheless, the results show that the
split announcement returns are more strongly related to the
improvements in both the liquidity level and liquidity risk.
Inconsistent with Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997),
neither the benchmark-adjusted nor market-adjusted
split announcement return is related to the expansion of
the investor base. We also experiment with lnchginves-
tor_D1 and lnchginvestor_D0 and ﬁnd no subsample
relations. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that it is not the
expanded investor base per se that is material in
explaining the split announcement returns; instead, what
matters is the extent of liquidity improvement and the
degree of liquidity risk reduction brought about by
expanded investor trading.
8. Conclusions
Despite extensive research on stock splits, Easley,
O’Hara, and Saar (2001) note that ‘‘it remains a puzzle
why companies ever split their shares.’’ To resolve the
puzzle, we propose and test the trading continuity
improvement hypothesis, which asserts that managers of
ﬁrms facing some possibility of trading discontinuity can
use stock splits to attract more uninformed trading, which
allows market makers to provide liquidity services at
lower costs. With lower trading costs, investors’ propen-
sity to trade increases, and investors face reduced liquidity
risk. We examine a large sample of stock splits and ﬁnd,
consistent with our hypothesis, that the incidence of no
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Table 8
Cross-sectional analysis of split announcement returns.
In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is annBAR, the three-day
benchmark-adjusted split announcement returns, and the explanatory
variables lnchgLM12, bil,1, lnpreLM12, and bil,0 are also benchmark-
adjusted. In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable is annMAR, the
market-adjusted split announcement returns, and the explanatory
variables lnchgLM12, bil,1, lnpreLM12, and bil,0 are not benchmark-
adjusted. For the subsample relations, we set lnchgLM12_D1 ¼
lnchgLM12 if preLM12Z1, otherwise lnchgLM12_D1 ¼ 0; and
lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ lnchgLM12 if preLM12o1, otherwise lnchgLM12_D0 ¼ 0.
Similarly, bil,1_D1 ¼ bil,1 if preLM12Z1, otherwise bil,1_D1 ¼ 0; and
bil,1_D0 ¼ bil,1 if preLM12o1, otherwise bil,1_D0 ¼ 0. The t-values are


















splitfactor 1.2451*** 1.2308*** 1.2446*** 1.2453***
(4.01) (3.96) (4.65) (4.66)
lnpreprc 2.8931*** 2.8647 *** 2.8439*** 2.8486***
(6.04) (5.98) (6.95) (6.96)
lnpresz 0.0205 0.0152 0.0350 0.0365
(0.12) (0.09) (0.29) (0.31)
lnprebm 1.2164*** 1.2139*** 0.9737*** 0.9813***
(6.31) (6.30) (6.59) (6.64)
prerunup 0.5359*** 0.5268*** 0.2378 0.2474
(2.66) (2.61) (1.47) (1.53)
lnpreLM12 0.3380*** 0.3324*** 0.0048 0.0043
(2.64) (2.59) (0.74) (0.66)
bil,0 0.2257** 0.2297** 0.4454*** 0.4211***
(2.20) (2.23) (3.91) (3.66)
lnchginvestor 0.0478 0.0548 0.2161 0.2078
(0.40) (0.46) (1.13) (1.09)
lnpreinslown 0.7510*** 0.7349*** 0.9435*** 0.9479***
(3.48) (3.40) (5.20) (5.21)
intercept 10.5074*** 10.3491*** 9.9959*** 9.9838***
(7.14) (7.00) (8.03) (8.02)
Adj. R2 0.0856 0.0855 0.1061 0.1062
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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trading decreases, implying lower latent costs of trading,
and that liquidity risk is mitigated following the splits.
Because stock splits improve trading continuity and
alleviate liquidity risk, investors require a lower liquidity
premium, resulting in a lower cost of equity capital. Our
analysis suggests that, on average, liquidity improvements
reduce the cost of equity capital by 17.3%, or 2.42
percentage points per annum. Thus, the economic beneﬁts
of stock splits are nontrivial. While less liquid ﬁrms
beneﬁt more from stock splits, ﬁrms that trade every day
beneﬁt as well.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms facing more frequent
trading discontinuities choose a higher split factor and
experience greater liquidity improvements. And the split
announcement returns tend to be higher for ﬁrms with a
larger decline in no-trade days and for ﬁrms with a greater
reduction in liquidity risk.
Overall, our study provides an explanation with
economic beneﬁts for why companies split their shares.
Our ﬁndings support managers’ view and Muscarella and
Vetsuypens’ (1996) ﬁndings that stock splits are intended
to improve liquidity. Also, in line with Lesmond, Ogden,
and Trzcinka (1999), Lesmond (2005), Liu (2006), and
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007), our study high-
lights the importance of using trading discontinuity to
measure liquidity.
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